The government's own reaction to some of these losses added plausibility to the narrative and suggested that any animosity might be mutual. A few days after the Court's rejection of his Senate reform plan, showing his frustration with the Court's judgments during the previous few months, the Prime Minister suggested that the Chief Justice had acted improperly by having attempted to contact him about the Nadon appointment. 9 The Prime Minister's remarks, and the Chief Justice's public response, were unprecedented in Canadian executive-judicial relations. 10 The government responded to its loss in the prostitution case by proposing Bill C-36, which retains the invalidated Criminal Code 6 . Tristin Hopper, "A Scorecard of the Harper government's wins and losses at the Supreme Court of Canada," National Post (April 15, 2015) . See http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/scoc-harper-gov-scorecard-741324 (accessed 31 July 2015). 7 .
Joseph Brean, "'Conscious objectivity': That's how the chief justice defines the top court's role. Harper might beg to differ," National Post (May 23, 2015) . See http://news.nationalpost.com/news/conscious-objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-justicedefines-the-top-courts-role-harper-might-beg-to-differ (accessed 31 July 2015). 8 .
Lorne Sossin, "Court Dismissed, The Walrus (January/February 2015). See http://thewalrus.ca/court-dismissed/ (accessed 2 August 2015). 9 .
This was in stark contrast to his initial measured reaction to the Nadon ruling on March 25 th , in which he stated that the government would respect both the letter and sprit of the decision. See http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-says-he-willrespect-supreme-courts-blocking-of-nadon/article17661060/ (accessed 11 August 2014). 10 .
Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, 2 May 2014.
provisions with some amendments, but also establishes two new criminal offences related to prostitution. 11 Similarly, it responded to an earlier loss concerning safe intravenous drug injection sites with Bill C-2, which would amend s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to require extensive submissions by provincial, local, and law enforcement authorities, among others, before the Minister could grant an exemption.
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The purpose of this article is to analyze this narrative more rigorously by going beyond a mere tallying of government wins and losses in the Court. Indeed, two features of constitutional litigation make the relationship between a government and the Supreme Court more difficult to determine than it might otherwise appear. First, with the notable exception of reference cases-where a government explicitly seeks a constitutional opinion from the Court-and some federalism cases-where one government directly challenges the actions of another-governments are usually involuntary participants in constitutional litigation. This is particularly true in cases involving the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where governments are forced to defend legislative and executive action against challenges from individuals and groups. Second, governments often find themselves defending legislation enacted by previous governments. Of course, governments may not always view this negatively: they may disagree with the statute under review, whatever its provenance, and thus welcome judicial intervention against it.
Nevertheless, the fact that governments are often parties to disputes over legislation or policies for which they are not responsible makes case outcomes a poor measure of government-judicial relations.
The article presents its analysis in three main parts. First, it examines Charterbased invalidations of federal legislation by the Supreme Court since 2006. Second, it 11 . For a good summary and analysis of Bill C-36, see http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?Language=E &ls=c36&Parl=41&Ses=2&source=library_prb (accessed 2 March 2015) . 12 .
This case was Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, which is discussed at length below. examines three critical reference opinions rendered by the Court at the government's own request, each of which delivered a result contrary to the government's wishes. Third, the article examines two key judgments delivered in the spring of 2015 concerning aboriginal rights and the elimination of the long-gun registry.
The Conservatives, the Supreme Court, and the Charter
The relationship between Canadian conservatism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, conservatives were among the most vocal, if not sole, opponents of adopting the Charter, and conservative scholars have been strong critics of the Charter and its judicial application. 13 On the other hand, The first step in understanding this aspect of the Conservative government's relationship to the Supreme Court under the Charter is to step back and look at the relationship between the Court and all post-Charter governments. The post-Charter era has been one of remarkably low turnover among governments in Canada. Indeed, there have only been three federal governments during this period: the Progressive Conservative government (1984 ( -1993 , the Liberal government (1993 ( -2006 , and the Conservative Party government (2006-current, hereafter CPC).
The Charter litigation experience of these governments before the Supreme Court illustrates the point made above that governments often find themselves engaged in litigation over a previous government's actions. As of 31 July 2015, these three governments were on the losing side in 51 cases in which the Court declared legislation (or other government action) unconstitutional under the Charter. 16 However, only six of those cases involved losses involving their own legislation. For example, although the PC government found itself on the losing side in 22 Charter cases, 21 of those losses came in cases defending legislation enacted by previous governments, including the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau (1968 -79, 1980 . Similarly, of the LIB2 government's seventeen Charter losses, fifteen involved legislation passed by previous governments. Finally, eight of the eleven CPC government's losses in Charter litigation have involved legislation enacted by predecessor governments.
The frequency with which the Harper government has had its legislation invalidated by the Court on Charter grounds (0.33 per year in office) compares quite favourably to its two predecessor governments (1.00 for the PC government and 0.38 for 16 . This figure includes all invalidations from 1984 until July 2015.
the LIB2 government). Moreover, the rate at which it has lost Charter cases as the defending government is lowest of the three governments to date (1.22 compared to 2.56 and 1.31). However, the CPC government's April 2015 loss with respect to mandatory minimum sentences for firearms violations raised both its number and rate of loss as both enactor and defender above that of its two predecessor governments. Societies that they were overly restrictive of the s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure when applied to the legal profession. The Court thus ordered that the impugned provisions be "read down" to exclude legal professionals from their scope of operation, leaving the statute otherwise intact.
While this judgment might be perceived as another judicial rejection of the CPC government's anti-terrorism policies, that perception would be overbroad. As in D.B.,
.
Although not responsible for enacting the provisions, they were partly the product of political pressure exerted by the CPC's precursors, the Reform Party and Canadian Alliance, when in opposition. 28 .
Note that Justice Marshall Rothstein, the first-and that point, only-justice appointed by the CPC government joined the dissenting judgment. 29 .
Canada ( To some degree, the CPC government was an innocent bystander in the Court's reconsideration of its own approach to labour-management relations. of the Act, the Minister was acting in a way that caused the Act to apply arbitrarily, over broadly, and grossly disproportionately. Arbitrarily because it produced a result directly contrary to the Act's purpose by undermining rather than protecting public health and 40 .
There was also a division of powers challenge to the legislation, but the Court rejected it relatively summarily. safety; grossly disproportionately because it increased the risk of death and disease among intravenous drug users without generating any public policy benefit for Canada.
Not only was the Court unambiguous in rebuking the Minister's decision, it imposed an unusually interventionist remedy. The Court determined that the special circumstance of the case merited a writ of mandamus, which is an order for a government official to take specific action. The Court thus ordered the Minister immediately to grant the exemption under s. 56, and it further defined the Minister's ongoing constitutional obligations in exercising discretion under the Act in a way that makes it virtually impossible to deny future applications for exemptions from Insite or any other supervised injection site like it. In PHS Community Services the Court chastised the CPC government for ignoring evidence "on which successive federal Ministers have relied in granting exemption orders over almost five years," 41 and acted to protect the policy status quo from a change in government.
A similar conflict is evident in Bedford. At issue was whether criminal prohibitions against keeping or being in a "bawdy house," living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purposes of prostitution infringe the constitutional right to security of the person under s.7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 42 The Court unanimously held that the impugned provisions did infringe s.7 by increasing the risk that prostitutes would become victims of violence while engaging in an activity-exchanging sex for money-that is not itself prohibited. The
Court further held that the infringement was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice because the impugned provisions were, as in PHS Community Services, arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate to their objectives. This was the second time the Court had been asked to review the constitutionality of these provisions under the Charter. See Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1) Nur (2015) , was the constitutionality of a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for firearm related offences that the CPC government had enacted in 2012. In a six-to-three judgment, with the Chief Justice writing for the majority, the Court held that this mandatory minimum constitutes an unjustified infringement of the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by s. 12 of the Charter. However, although the majority concluded that the five-year mandatory minimum might foreseeably be grossly disproportionate if applied to other offenders, it conceded that it was not grossly disproportionate as applied to the specific offenders involved in the appeal. Consequently, the majority invalidated the provision, but upheld the sentences applied both to Nur and the other offender involved in the appeal.
In reaching her judgment, the Chief Justice concentrated on the principle of proportionality in sentencing, which she defined as "a highly individualized exercise, tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm 43 .
[2013] 3 S.C.R 1101, para. 165.
caused by the crime." 44 Mandatory minimum sentences, she argued, threaten this principle due to their emphasis on "denunciation, general deterrence, and retribution." 45 Moreover, she found only the weakest of rational connections between mandatory minimum sentences and general deterrence, although she agreed that such a connection did exist with respect to denunciation and retribution. 46 Finally, imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for mere possession of firearms, rather than more closely connecting it to "conduct attracting significant moral blameworthiness," violated the principle of minimal impairment of rights.
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In many respects, given the majority's rejection of the sentencing principlesdenunciation, general deterrence, retribution-undoubtedly embraced by the CPC government, 48 Nur presents itself as a clear case of the Court's repudiating a recentlyenacted core policy of the government. However, even Nur is more complicated than this.
The Chief Justice did not reverse the sentences in the specific cases, nor did she even declare mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutional per se (although she set a very high threshold for justifying them). Most obviously, unlike PHS Community Services, Carter, and Bedford, the Court was divided in Nur. Furthermore, the CPC government was not alone in defending the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum: Ontario defended the law as a party to the case, and British Columbia and Alberta intervened in favour of upholding its constitutionality. Finally, one of the CPC government's allies in another case involving the gun registry (discussed below) was opposed to it in this case.
Both the overall picture, and specific circumstances, of judicial invalidations under the Charter during the CPC government indicate a much more complex 44 . R. v. Nur, [2015] SCR 15 at para. 43. 45 .
Ibid., para. 44. 46 .
Ibid., para. 115. 47 .
Ibid., para. 117. 48 .
For a good analysis of the CPC government's crime agenda under the Charter, see Kent Roach, "The Charter versus the Government's Crime Agenda," Supreme Court Law Revew (2d) 58 (2012), 211-43. relationship between the Court and the government than can be captured through a simple "scorecard" of outcomes. Indeed, two of the losses that have contributed significantly to the narrative-Bedford and Carter-involved legislation passed by previous governments, as well as reversals of the position taken by the Court itself in earlier judgments. Even the CPC government's confrontational responses to PHS Community Services and Bedford were not unprecedented: neither the PC nor LIB2 governments quietly deferred to the Court in a series of losses in the area of sexual assault, for example. 49 To be sure, the book is not yet closed on the Court-CPC relationship, and future judgments-including those rendered after the CPC leaves government-may alter the picture in a manner more consistent with the "fractious relationship" narrative.
Nevertheless, this set of evidence suggests that, at least for the moment, the narrative is exaggerated.
The Reference Cases
Bedford, PHS Community Services, Carter and Nur represent the typical situation in which governments are pulled into constitutional litigation involuntarily. The same cannot be said of most reference cases, where governments seek to advance their policy agenda by extracting a favourable advisory opinion from the Court. The three occasions on which the CPC government has sought advice from the Court through the reference procedure are hybrids that combine both involuntary and purposeful elements. In each instance actions were launched, or threatened, by other parties, drawing the CPC government into a legal battle over which it sought to gain greater control by initiating its own process and framing its own questions; in each instance the tactic was authority over all aspects of its regulation. 52 The Court disagreed, finding that, although "aspects of the securities market are national in scope and affect the country as a whole," the proposed legislation mostly dealt with matters that had traditionally been recognized as falling within provincial legislative authority over property and civil rights within the province. 53 The Court therefore answered the reference question in the negative, advising the CPC government that it could not establish a single, national scheme to regulate the securities trade under a single regulatory body.
Although the Court expressed agnosticism with respect to "whether a single national securities scheme is preferable to multiple provincial regimes," 54 it did express a strong preference about how federalism should function. It urged "the federal 50 .
government and the provinces to exercise their respective powers over securities harmoniously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism." 55 Consequently, the Court refused to signal which alternative scheme might be constitutional, but it did find it appropriate to "note the growing practice of resolving the complex governance problems that arise in federations…by seeking cooperative solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent parts." 56 According to the Court, the "federalism principle upon which Canada's constitutional framework rests" demands nothing less than that cooperation be its "animating force." concerned with how the federal government proposed to substitute a national regulatory regime for the existing local regimes. To be fair, it is arguable that this concern also extended to the provinces that intervened in the reference: the Court's message to both was cooperation rather than confrontation.
.
Ibid., para. 9, 56 .
Ibid., para. 132. 57 .
Ibid., para. 133. 58 .
Others On October 22, the CPC government's omnibus budget bill included amendments to the Supreme Court Act to clarify that Federal Court judges appointed from Quebec are eligible to fill Quebec vacancies, and it sent a reference to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of these amendments and Nadon's appointment itself.
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The Court heard oral argument in the Supreme Court Reference on January 15, and delivered its judgment on March 21. In its 6-1 decision, the Court answered both questions posed to it by the CPC government in the negative, rejecting both the government's interpretation of the Supreme Court Act and its assertion of legislative authority to amend the act to make it clear that former members of the bar, including the Quebec bar, are eligible for appointment. 60 At issue on the first question was the relationship between ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act. Section 5 specifies the requirement that anyone can be appointed to the Court who is or has been a member of a provincial superior court or a member of a provincial bar for at least ten years; section 6 specifies that at least three of the Court's judges "shall be appointed from among the judges of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec or from among the advocates of that Province." The Court determined that s.5 established a minimal threshold for eligibility and that s.6 created an additional requirement of current membership for eligibility for the Quebec seats. Consequently, although s.6 did not specify a minimum length of membership in the Québec bar, the majority held that the threshold of ten years membership established in s.5 also applies to the Québec seats.
.
One of the unanswered questions about this sequence of events is why Justice Nadon voluntarily abstained from taking up the position to which he had been duly sworn, or why the government took the legislative and legal action it did. One can imagine a scenario in which Justice Nadon took his seat on the Court and began hearing, and deciding, cases during the period that both the private and reference challenges to his appointment worked their way through the judicial system. In this circumstance, judicial invalidation of his appointment would have thrown into doubt the results of any case in which he had participated. With this possibility in mind, would any court have been willing to invalidate the appointment? 60 .
Justice Moldaver dissented. He agreed with the CPC government's interpretation of sections 5 and 6 and therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the amendments were legitimate (as they were redundant given his answer to the first question).
The Court thus declared that Federal Court judges like Justice Nadon are ineligible for appointment to one of the Court's Québec seats.
This result was a clear defeat for the CPC government, but it is perhaps the Court's treatment of the second reference question that is more important. The government passed amendments to both sections 5 and 6 designed to clarify that past membership in a provincial bar for ten years, including for the Québec seats, satisfied the eligibility requirement. There was some ambiguity in s.5, which recognized past membership on a superior court more explicitly than past membership of a provincial bar. The clarifying amendment for s.5 was ultimately unnecessary, as the Court resolved this ambiguity in favour of past membership in both sets of institutions. 62 .
The 7/50 formula stipulates that amendments may be enacted through resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and the legislative assemblies of two-thirds of the provinces representing at least 50 percent of the population. outcome in the Supreme Court Act Reference both blocked an action important to the CPC government and served the Court's long-term institutional interests. In this sense, the Supreme Court Reference represents a perfect strategic victory for the Court relative to the government: it maximized both its short-term policy interest in influencing appointments to the Court and its long-term institutional power and prestige. Perhaps no case better illustrates the Court's status as a political rather than legal institution.
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Slightly more than a month later the Court issued its unanimous opinion in the Senate Reference. The CPC government launched this reference after Quebec announced that it was submitting a reference to the Quebec Court of Appeal concerning Bill C-7, through which the CPC government hoped to achieve certain reforms to the Senate.
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The bill proposed to reform the Senate in two ways: (1) by providing an electoral framework, adopted by provinces and territories at their own discretion, to generate a list of nominees that must be considered by the Prime Minister in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General; and (2) Readers should note that I prepared an expert opinion for the Government of Canada in the Quebec reference case, which Canada also filed as part of its evidence in the Supreme Court reference. 65 .
This path to constitutional amendment applies to matters relating to executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.
Three principal objections were raised to Bill C-7: (1) that it would undermine the Senate's independence; (2) that it would change the method of selecting senators by transferring authority from the Prime Minister to the electorate; and (3) The Court reached this opinion largely on the grounds that the Constitution should be understood as a comprehensive structure, with a particular architecture that was greater than the sum of its "discrete textual provisions. Ibid., paras. 71-83. This is not the place to engage in a full-scale analysis of the Court's conceptual, historical, and empirical reasoning in the Senate Reference. My research and conclusion on these matters can be found in Christopher Manfredi, "Expert Opinion on the Possible Effects of Bill C-7, An Act respecting the election of Senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits," June 2013 (filed by the Government of Canada in the Québec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada). One thing worth noting is the Court's relative lack of engagement with the numerous expert reports submitted by both sides in the proceedings. To be sure, the Court cited several scholarly studies of the Senate and the amending procedure, but only two of those studies spoke directly to the substance of Bill C-7. Perhaps the Court determined that the content of those expert reports was adequately communicated in the parties' facta and oral arguments. 69 .
In late July 2015 the Prime Minister announced a moratorium on Senate appointments. See Steven Chase, "Stephen Harper vows not to make any Senate appointments," Globe and Mail (July 24, 2015) , http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-wall-to-call-for-abolition-ofsenate-on-friday-report/article25658737/ (accessed 18 August 2015). 70 .
Alani v. The Prime Minister, the Governor General, and the Queen's Privy Council for Canada (Federal Court, Trial Division, T-2506-14) . Readers should note that I prepared an expert opinion in this case for the Government of Canada.
Aboriginal Title and the Gun Registry
Among the judgments frequently cited in support of the narrative that the CPC government is facing a particularly oppositional Supreme Court is Tsilhqot'in Nation v.
British Columbia (2014). Tsilhqot'in people were thus appealing that loss to the Supreme Court; this was not a case of an intransigent government seeking to reverse rights unambiguously granted throughout lower court proceedings. Finally, to accept Tsilhqot'in as a judgment 71 . Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257. 72 .
Ibid., para. 2.
especially targeted against the CPC government, it is necessary that one or both of two counterfactuals be true. First, that another government would have conceded the case or defended Crown title and regulatory authority less vigorously; or second, that the Court would have reached a different conclusion had the CPC government not been in power.
Although the Court was undoubtedly aware of the political and policy context of the dispute, there is little evidence that the CPC government fared worse in Tsilhqot'in than would have another government. The decision was a narrow one-five-to-four-but the majority judgment, which included the Chief Justice in this instance, found destruction of the data both within
.
It might also be noted that, in 2011, the Court unanimously rejected an Aboriginal title claim in Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General) , [2011] In order to explore this narrative analytically, the article closely examined three types of cases: instances of judicial invalidation under the Charter, key reference opinions, and two cases involving Aboriginal rights and the gun registry. One key finding is that it is difficult to draw a direct line from losses in Charter cases to any particular relationship between the government and the Court. In 73 percent of the CPC's Charter losses, the policy invalidated by the Court belonged to a predecessor government. Indeed, as defender or enactor, the CPC's record in Charter cases has not differed significantly from that of the two other post-Charter governments. Even the Tsilhqot'in Nation judgment is not necessarily a clear strike against the CPC government:
British Columbia was the principal respondent, and the LIB2 government was initially responsible for making the federal argument against title in the case. By contrast, the inherited from previous governments. This is an interesting avenue for further research, but it would also require undertaking an overall evaluation of how all governments approach inherited litigation to determine whether one government's approach is unique in some way.
Perhaps the most interesting development since 2006 is the adoption of a more consistently confrontational approach by the CPC government in its legislative responses compared to its predecessors. This has occurred even in cases like PHS Community Services and Bedford, where the invalidated legislation or policy did not originate with the CPC government. Although other governments also refused to defer completely to the Court in certain areas, it may be emerging as the norm under the CPC government. In this sense, the CPC government may be asserting an equal authority to interpret the Constitution's meaning that could bring it into much sharper conflict with the Court.
